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The Formation of Fairness Perceptions in the Cooperation between 
Entrepreneurs and Universities 
Abstract 
For entrepreneurs who intend to exploit university-owned technologies, a cooperative relationship 
with the university is critical. This study aims to better understand this entrepreneur-university 
cooperation. A key factor influencing the quality of this cooperation is the fairness perception of the 
entrepreneur. However, little is known about how these fairness perceptions are formed in this 
context. Therefore, to increase insight in entrepreneur-university cooperation, this study explores the 
formation of fairness perceptions by entrepreneurs who cooperate with universities (in so-called 
university spin-offs). This study assesses how the rules these entrepreneurs employ to form fairness 
perceptions differ from fairness rules that have been established in previous studies on organizational 
justice. The results show that, in addition to established fairness rules, there are also fairness rules that 
are more specific to this entrepreneurial setting. These specific rules complement the established 
fairness rules to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the formation of fairness perceptions 
by entrepreneurs cooperating with a university. Moreover, this study explores to what extent different 
entrepreneurs form fairness perceptions differently and finds that both experience and relational 
capital of the entrepreneurs within the university are two key sources of heterogeneity. Overall, this 
study contributes to the literature by conceptualizing how entrepreneurs form fairness perceptions in 
cooperating with universities and how this extends established wisdom in organizational justice 
theory. Moreover, the rules identified in this study provide clues for entrepreneurs who wish to 
improve their collaboration with universities, and may also apply to the relationships between 
entrepreneurs and large corporations and between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists.  
 
Keywords: entrepreneurship, university spin-offs, cooperation, experience, fairness, technology 
commercialization. 
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Introduction 
Universities provide new knowledge that can be exploited by entrepreneurs (Sherwood and Covin 
2008; Un, Cuervo-Cazurra and Asakawa 2010). Through cooperation with a university, these 
entrepreneurs can commercialize university technology, which often also makes an important 
contribution to regional economic development (Breznitz, O‟Shea and Allen 2008; Clarysse et al. 
2005). Although such university-industry relationships have been studied extensively (Ahrweiler, 
Pyka and Gilbert 2011; Rothaermel, Agung and Jiang 2007), the precise factors that make such 
cooperation successful have received limited attention (Ambos et al. 2008). It has been suggested that 
one of the key factors affecting the degree and continuation of successful cooperation with the 
university is the degree in which an entrepreneur assesses the relationship with the university as fair 
(Jensen and Thursby 2001; Rappert, Webster and Charles 1999). However, it is unclear how these 
fairness perceptions are exactly formed in the entrepreneur-university cooperation.  
 Previous studies have demonstrated that fairness perceptions have a significant effect on 
cooperation, where fairness perceptions refer to individual, subjective assessments of what is just in a 
relationship (Colquitt et al. 2001). Within new product development teams, perceptions of fair 
interactions foster dedication, increase learning, and reduce development time (Akgün, Keskin and 
Byrne 2010). In cooperation between organizations, perceptions of fairness enhance mutual learning 
and trust-building, leading to higher performance (Bstieler 2006; Busenitz, Fiet and Moesel 2004), 
while perceived unfairness is associated with uncooperative behavior and ceased cooperation, even if 
this is detrimental to the venture‟s development (Ariño and Ring 2010; Busenitz et al. 1997).  
 These insightful findings on the role of fairness notwithstanding, previous studies of the 
cooperation of entrepreneurs with other parties have assumed that established fairness (organizational 
justice) theory accurately describes the formation of fairness by entrepreneurs (e.g., Busenitz, Moesel, 
Fiet and Barney 1997; Daellenbach and Davenport 2004; Sapienza and Korsgaard 1996). However, 
organizational justice theory describes the fairness rules guiding the formation of fairness perceptions 
in employer-employee relationships. These fairness rules may not necessarily be valid for 
entrepreneur-university relationships, for two reasons. First, this type of entrepreneurial cooperation is 
characterized by unforeseeable uncertainty (Loch, Solt and Bailey 2008), which differs fundamentally 
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from uncertainty due to information asymmetry as in employer-employee relationships (van den Bos, 
Lind and Wilke 2001). Because of unforeseeable uncertainty, entrepreneurs and universities may 
disagree about the way of estimating the value they are creating as well as about the appropriation of 
this future value. As entrepreneurs bear the majority of the unforeseeable uncertainty in 
commercializing the invention, they may believe to be entitled to appropriate most of the value, and 
feel unfairly treated if the university acts otherwise (see Kirzner 1989). Second, entrepreneurs engage 
in new venturing activities because they want autonomy and freedom (Shane 2003; Taylor 1996). As 
entrepreneurs also tend to believe they own the opportunity (Kirzner 1989; 2002), they want control 
over the pursuit of their opportunity and may feel treated unfairly if the university wants a say in the 
venture as well (Rappert, Webster and Charles 1999). Both the role of unforeseeable uncertainty and 
these venture control aspects are not covered in the fairness rules established in workplace settings, 
which suggests that the formation of fairness perceptions by entrepreneurs may be guided by different 
rules than those employed in the relationship between employers and employees.  
 To address these issues, this article aims to understand the formation of fairness as a key factor 
that impacts entrepreneur-university cooperation, thus giving insights in what ways this cooperation 
can be enhanced. To accomplish this, this study explores how the formation of fairness perceptions in 
collaborative processes between entrepreneurs and universities differs from established wisdom in 
organizational justice theory. In-depth analysis of interviews with the founders of 26 ventures serves 
to identify the fairness rules these entrepreneurs employ. This study assesses whether these rules are 
already covered in the established rules regarding distributive, procedural, interpersonal and 
informational fairness (see Colquitt 2001) or rather complement these rules. In addition, this study 
explores whether different entrepreneurs employ these rules in different ways, by considering two 
entrepreneur characteristics: experience and relational capital.  
 
Theoretical Background 
The theoretical background of this exploratory study introduces key aspects of the formation of 
fairness perceptions in the cooperation between entrepreneurs and universities, drawing on research 
regarding entrepreneur-university relationships and fairness. First, the role of entrepreneurs‟ fairness 
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perceptions in their cooperation with universities is discussed and subsequently how the formation of 
these fairness perceptions is driven by characteristics of the entrepreneur-university cooperation.  
 
Fairness Perceptions and Entrepreneur–University Cooperation 
For entrepreneurs who intend to exploit university-owned technologies, a cooperative relationship 
with the university is critical (George, Zahra and Wood 2002; Van Burg et al. 2008; Vohora, Wright 
and Lockett 2004). In the conception phase of their venture, cooperation is important to receive 
support to start the venture (Djokovic and Souitaris 2008), to acquire and develop the technology 
(Shane 2004), and to obtain access to facilities and equipment (Fini, Grimaldi and Sobrero 2009). In 
later phases of the new venture, cooperation with the university remains critical to facilitate the 
exchange of tacit knowledge in order to further develop the technology into additional new products 
and services (Jensen and Thursby 2001; Shane 2002).  
 To establish and maintain this cooperative relationship, entrepreneurs need to negotiate with the 
university, as the owner of the new technology (Stevens and Bagby 2001), about the acquisition of 
intellectual property rights, the design of revenue splitting schemes and the control over the venture 
(Steffensen, Rogers and Speakman 2000). In these negotiations, the technology transfer office (TTO) 
of the university usually represents the university and the research group where the invention was 
created (Siegel, Veugelers and Wright 2007). The literature on university-industry relationships shows 
that the quality of entrepreneur-university cooperation depends on the perception of fairness in this 
bargaining process (Daellenbach and Davenport 2004; Nicolaou and Birley 2003; Rappert, Webster 
and Charles 1999; Siegel et al. 2004). When entrepreneurs feel treated unfairly by the university, 
establishing and maintaining effective cooperation becomes difficult.  
 Perceptions of fairness are particularly affecting cooperative behavior in such negotiation settings 
(Molm, Takahashi and Peterson 2003), and are even more influential if one of the partners is more 
powerful than the other (Husted and Folger 2004). The cooperation between an individual 
entrepreneur and a large, established university is a relationship with asymmetric power distribution 
(Feldman et al. 2002). Technology transfer officers negotiating with entrepreneurs can be at risk of 
abusing their powerful position. Entrepreneurs may become frustrated if they feel unfairly treated 
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because of such power abuse, for example in the case of unclear or corrupt procedures (Daellenbach 
and Davenport 2004; Lind and Tyler 1988), or if they feel that the university is primarily interested in 
revenue generation rather than in a fair exploitation of the intellectual property (Colyvas 2007). As a 
consequence, some entrepreneurs become „cynical‟ with regard to the relation with the university 
(Welsh et al. 2008: 1862). The rules that guide the distribution of appropriation and control rights are 
often unclear or even absent, leading to negotiations that take much longer and are perceived as unfair 
(De Cleyn and Braet 2008; Lockett, Wright and Franklin 2003). In such cases, the fairness 
perceptions may influence the entrepreneurs‟ negotiation behavior, often resulting in suboptimal 
negotiation results for the entrepreneurs themselves (Blount and Larrick 2000). If they are sufficiently 
upset by the negotiations, they might terminate the cooperation and pursue litigation (Feldman, Feller, 
Bercovitz and Burton 2002).  
 Although studies have reported the importance of fairness in entrepreneurial cooperation, none of 
them has considered how fairness perceptions are actually formed in such an entrepreneurship 
context. According to established organizational justice theory, fairness is formed along four 
dimensions (Colquitt 2001). These dimensions of fairness have been established by means of 
laboratory experiments and field studies which investigated fairness formation in the context of 
employer-employee relationships. Distributive justice refers to the perceived fairness of the allocation 
of outcomes in an exchange; it is enhanced when implicit norms of equity are met. Procedural justice 
refers to the perceived fairness of the process and is, for example, fostered by applying procedures 
consistently during the decision making process. Interpersonal justice refers to polite and respectful 
execution of procedures and determination of outcomes. Informational justice refers to the 
explanations and information regarding the procedures and outcomes. Entrepreneurship researchers 
who used these organizational justice concepts found that in particular the degree of procedural justice 
has a positive effect on the cooperation between entrepreneurs and their partners, with important 
implications for cooperation continuation and venture performance (Ariño and Ring 2010; Busenitz, 
Moesel, Fiet and Barney 1997; Busenitz, Fiet and Moesel 2004; Kim and Mauborgne 1998; Sapienza 
and Korsgaard 1996). However, these studies implicitly assumed that established fairness rules, 
observed in employer-employee relationships, are applicable to cooperation by entrepreneurs as well. 
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They have not assessed whether these fairness dimensions need to be complemented with fairness 
rules specific to the entrepreneurship setting. Understanding how these entrepreneurs form fairness 
perceptions gives insight in a key factor of entrepreneur-university cooperation, and thus may help to 
enhance this cooperation.  
 
Specific Characteristics of Entrepreneur-University Cooperation Influencing Fairness Formation  
The established fairness rules may not necessarily be valid for entrepreneur-university cooperation as 
this setting differs in at least two important ways from employer-employee relationships. Cooperation 
between universities and entrepreneurs is impacted by high levels of unforeseeable uncertainty as well 
as by the importance of venture control for the entrepreneur (Brockhaus and Horowitz 1986; Loch, 
Solt and Bailey 2008). Unforeseeable uncertainty refers to unawareness of unforeseen problems, so-
called „unknown unknowns‟ that emerge during the venturing process and can significantly influence 
the results (Loch, Solt and Bailey 2008; Sommer and Loch 2004). Established fairness rules only 
apply under conditions of uncertainty caused by a lack of information; to enhance fairness, employers 
have to give timely, accurate and unbiased information (Colquitt 2001; van den Bos, Lind and Wilke 
2001).  
 Unforeseeable uncertainty can impact fairness perceptions regarding how the future value being 
created in the entrepreneur-university cooperation is estimated and later on appropriated (Feldman, 
Feller, Bercovitz and Burton 2002). Often, the entrepreneur has a double role as university researcher 
and as entrepreneur, and (s)he is inclined to estimate that most of the – uncertain – value was created 
in private entrepreneurial activities, while the university may assess that most of the value was created 
at the university side (see Welsh, Glenna, Lacy and Biscotti 2008). Moreover, although the university 
has invested in the research, the commercialization of that research is very uncertain because of the 
difficulty in identifying and protecting a suitable business opportunity (Dechenaux et al. 2008). The 
entrepreneur bears the main consequences of the unforeseeable uncertainty in the commercialization 
trajectory, and thus may feel to have the right to appropriate most of it as well. As the university acts 
otherwise, (s)he may feel treated unfairly (see Kirzner 1989). Under conditions of unforeseeable 
uncertainty, entrepreneurs may assess fairness in terms of how future value is estimated, assessing the 
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respective contributions of the university and the entrepreneur to the creation of commercial value, 
and in terms of how the eventual appropriation rights are distributed (see Alvarez and Parker 2009; 
Alvarez and Barney 2005). Although unforeseeable uncertainty seems to impact the formation of 
fairness (Shepherd and Zacharakis 2001), existing studies neglected this effect as it is not represented 
in established fairness rules.  
 Venture control is important for entrepreneurs because one of the main reasons to become self-
employed and to engage in venturing activities is that they want autonomy and freedom (Shane 2003; 
Taylor 1996). Entrepreneurs also perceive that they own the opportunity exploited in their venture 
(Kirzner 1989; 2002). As a result, they want to control the direction of the commercialization 
trajectory and may feel treated unfairly if the university wants control rights as well, for instance by 
claiming venture equity (Rappert, Webster and Charles 1999). Whereas established fairness rules 
refer to hierarchical relationships between employees and employers, cooperative relationships 
between universities and entrepreneurs do not imply hierarchy and therefore control has to be 
negotiated. Although the university may be more powerful, the entrepreneur usually aspires to have 
most of the control rights. Therefore, giving part of the control to the university could directly induce 
perceived unfairness, even more so as entrepreneurs tend to believe they personally own the 
entrepreneurial opportunity related to the technology, even though intellectual property laws may say 
otherwise (Rappert, Webster and Charles 1999). This endowment effect frames fairness evaluations, 
as people tend to assess negotiation outcomes as unfair if they expected to get much more (Ordonez, 
Connolly and Coughlan 2000; Thaler 1980).  
 Moreover, individual characteristics of the entrepreneur can influence the formation of fairness 
perceptions. Earlier studies have identified two characteristics: 1) entrepreneurial experience and 2) 
the relational capital of the entrepreneur within the university organization. Experience is personal 
capital accumulated by previous business or startup experiences (Greeno and Simon 1988). This 
characteristic is individual in nature and unrelated to the university. Previous experiences provide a 
cognitive stock of transactions which constitute the frame of reference against which the cooperation 
and contract are evaluated (Kahneman 1992; Lehner 2000; Ordonez, Connolly and Coughlan 2000). 
Busenitz et al. (1997) found that an entrepreneur‟s prior firm and industry experience positively 
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influences perceived fairness. Thus, fairness perceptions may become increasingly channeled by past 
experience (Burmeister and Schade 2007; Dew et al. 2009).  
 Furthermore, the relational capital of the entrepreneurs within the incumbent university 
organization is indicated by their formal position in the organization. Their relational capital expresses 
the amount and quality of relations and resources within the organization. Individuals with a higher 
formal position (e.g., tenured professors) in the organization tend to have more internal relationships 
and also possess more resources. As a result, they tend to conform to existing practices (Bercovitz and 
Feldman 2008), as those practices sustain and reinforce the positions of these more central players, 
not the least because they may have contributed to shaping these practices. Moreover, people who 
strongly identify with a group or organization are prone to judge these group processes as fair (Tyler 
and Blader 2003). In contrast, more peripheral people (e.g., PhD or (under)graduate students and 
external entrepreneurs) are less connected to the central norms and existing practices, and may be 
disadvantaged by prevailing institutions (Greenwood and Hinings 1996). These individuals may not 
identify themselves strongly with this organization, and may therefore be less prone to judge 
processes as fair ex ante. As a result, the relational capital of the entrepreneur is likely to influence 
his/her fairness judgments and thus also may have an impact on whether and how an effective 
cooperation with the university can be established and maintained.  
 
Methods 
Research Setting and Sample Selection 
This study explores the formation of fairness perceptions of 26 entrepreneurs cooperating with a 
university to exploit university inventions. The focus is on finding the rules these „academic 
entrepreneurs‟ draw on when assessing the fairness of the transaction with the university, while 
adopting the research approach employed in studies that identified specific fairness rules in workplace 
settings (Bies and Moag 1986; Hollensbe, Khazanchi and Masterson 2008). 
 The majority of entrepreneurs in this study (19) cooperated with Eindhoven University of 
Technology (TU/e). In addition, six entrepreneurs cooperating with Wageningen University and 
Research Center (WUR) were selected serve to analyze the context-dependency of the results. 
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Technology developed within the university provided the basis for the product or service that the new 
ventures (intended to) bring to market. Typically, the invention was far-from-commercialization and 
substantial development work was still required, making continued cooperation necessary.  
 Both universities actively supported venturing activities to commercialize inventions with support 
professionals, office space and lab facilities. Both universities claimed a share in the company‟s 
equity, royalty payments, or a fixed fee in return for the university‟s technology that the entrepreneur 
wanted to license. At WUR, this was accompanied by investments in these new ventures by the 
university‟s TTO. The exact details of the agreement with the entrepreneurs depended on the 
technology (how far it was developed), the entrepreneurs (to what extent did they wish to use 
university facilities, etc.), and the negotiation process itself. Faculty members were allowed to engage 
in venturing activities and take equity in such ventures. According to the managing director of the 
technology transfer unit of TU/e, the rules around technology transfer and cooperation with new 
ventures were intended to create fairness in revenue distribution: “This means: fair for the 
entrepreneur, fair for the faculty, fair for the university, and fair for society.” 
 The following criteria were applied to compose a set of new ventures with sufficient variance. The 
selection includes entrepreneurs with sufficient variety regarding entrepreneurial experience arising 
from prior new venturing efforts, and regarding the relational capital within the university 
organization. To reduce sampling biases, new ventures were selected with sufficient variance 
regarding the survival of the company (ceased ventures are included to avoid success bias, Davidsson 
2004), the development stage of the company (ranging from early stage to mature companies, Vohora, 
Wright and Lockett 2004), the industry and technology (e.g., information technology, biotech and 
automotive, Shane 2001; Shane 2003), and the outcome of negotiations with the university (i.e., the 
percentage of shares owned by the university and the royalty percentage). In addition to these 
entrepreneurial, contextual and venture characteristics, variety was obtained with regard to the 
dependent variable (i.e., „fair‟ and „unfair‟ perceptions).  
 To select those new ventures, a list of all intellectual property-based companies from both 
universities was used. In consultation with technology transfer officers from each university ventures 
were assessed based on the sampling criteria and an initial selection was composed with substantial 
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variation. The final selection – including 26 different ventures, 19 from TU/e and 7 from WUR – was 
composed iteratively during the data collection process. Table 1 presents the selected new ventures.  
------------- Insert Table 1 about here -------------- 
Data Collection 
The main data were 36 open-ended interviews with entrepreneurs representing the 26 ventures (see 
Table 1). The interviews were semi-structured, drawing on a topically structured interview protocol. 
The interview protocol started with generic questions about the development of the venturing process 
(e.g., “Can you tell us about your background and how you decided to start a company?”; “What has 
changed since the start of the company? What was the start situation and what is the current 
situation?”). Next, the interview protocol focused on a number of relevant topics, identified from 
existing work on entrepreneur-university cooperation (e.g., Djokovic and Souitaris 2008; Rothaermel, 
Agung and Jiang 2007; Shane 2004): facilities, financing, advice and coaching, intellectual property 
and negotiations, networks, and the university context in general. These questions included open 
questions regarding experiences and perceptions, but also ensured that all relevant dimensions of 
existing fairness theory were covered (i.e., distributive, procedural, interpersonal and informational 
fairness). All interviews were recorded and fully transcribed. The first interviews with the 
entrepreneurs served to streamline the protocol and reword some of the questions. In four cases, 
follow-up interviews were conducted to clarify issues that remained ambiguous in the analysis. In 
three other cases, follow-up interviews were conducted after the negotiations with the university were 
completed, which was not the case at the time of the first interview. These three cases were 
instrumental in exploring whether the use of fairness rules changed during the negotiations. In 
addition, these follow-up interviews, combined with our frequent interactions with entrepreneurs and 
university representatives, mitigated biases arising from retrospection by combining retrospective data 
with current data (Leonard-Barton 1990).  
 In addition to the interviews with entrepreneurs, other people within the university were 
interviewed to triangulate the stories of the entrepreneurs (Jick 1979). Using a similar protocol as for 
the entrepreneurs, we interviewed 11 people in 15 interviews at TU/e and 5 people in 6 interviews at 
WUR. These interviews included the director and several other officers at the TTOs (including the 
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officers who represented the university in the negotiations with the entrepreneurs in our study) as well 
as entrepreneurship trainers and advisors. By means of these interviews, data were collected regarding 
general policies and practices dealing with advice, facilities, financing, networking, intellectual 
property policies, negotiations about intellectual property and costs of the facilities, and the 
procedures and regulations. Moreover, these respondents were questioned about the negotiations and 
their thoughts about the fairness perceptions of the entrepreneurs in the sample. As a next step in the 
triangulation procedure, archival data were consulted. These included business plans and other 
documents such as subsidy proposals written by the entrepreneurs, newspaper articles, brochures and 
website information. At the university level, archival data included documentation describing formal 
policies and protocols.  
 
Data Analysis and Coding Procedures 
Detailed analysis of fairness formation was performed by following coding procedures similar to 
those used by Hollensbe et al. (2008) and Butterfield et al. (1996). The transcribed interviews with 
entrepreneurs were first coded to identify fairness-related expressions. Entrepreneurs assessed in those 
expressions the fairness of the relationship with the university. Fairness assessments were primarily 
related to the support by the university in starting the venture, to the negotiations with the university, 
and to the procedures that the university uses to deal with new ventures. Typically, fairness 
perceptions most clearly surface in negotiations and renegotiations with the university‟s technology 
transfer officers (see Alvarez and Parker 2009; Reuer and Ariño 2002). QSR NVivo software served 
to build a code database. The fairness related expressions were coded using a dictionary containing 
pre-defined as well as new codes. The pre-defined codes included the rules underlying the established 
four fairness dimensions as reported by Colquitt (2001). Table 3 illustrates this coding process. For 
example, procedural fairness was coded strictly in terms of the seven rules used by Colquitt (2001) 
(e.g., quotes reflecting consistently applied procedures or the unbiased application of procedures). If a 
fairness quote did not reflect any of the established rules underlying the four existing dimensions, it 
got a new code and was assigned to the category of specific fairness rules that did not fit the 
predefined rules. This open coding process for specific rules became saturated at the 15
th
 transcript, 
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when no more new codes were added. After coding all the transcripts, similar coding categories were 
clustered. To ensure the robustness of the findings, specific rules reported by three or less respondents 
were excluded (see Hollensbe, Khazanchi and Masterson 2008). This assessment resulted in nine final 
codes for specific fairness rules. Table 2 defines these final codes and displays representative coding 
examples. In addition, each transcript was coded in terms of fair or unfair perceptions.  
 To check the reliability of the coding, the secondary coding procedures advocated by Butterfield 
et al. (1996) and Hollensbe et al. (2008) were applied. Two independent coders unfamiliar with the 
study (two graduate students) applied the nine final codes for the identified specific fairness rules. 
These coders received the final codes and their definitions, together with a selection of expressions 
from the transcripts of all interviewees. First, the coders were instructed to make a yes/no judgment 
whether a passage reflected a fairness evaluation. Subsequently, they were asked whether this passage 
reflected a specific fairness rule or an established fairness rule, and if so, which one. The overall 
coding agreement was .83, which suggests that the final codes sufficiently fit the data. Moreover, the 
same procedure was used to check the accuracy of coding fair versus unfair perceptions, which 
resulted in 100% agreement. 
 To explore the use of the established fairness rules and the specific fairness rules, the effect of 
entrepreneurial experience and relational capital (indicated by the formal position) was explored (see 
Table 1). The coding of the transcripts for entrepreneurial experience and relational capital was also 
informed by information such as business plans and interviews with university officials. 
Entrepreneurial experience is operationalized as follows: the experienced group involves 
entrepreneurs who had been involved in new venturing activities before; the inexperienced group 
involves entrepreneurs who were graduate students when starting a company, or faculty without any 
business experience. In ventures with multiple team members, experience can vary among team 
members. This effect is taken into account by qualitatively evaluating experience characteristics; for 
example, if most of the entrepreneurs in the team are experienced, the case is coded as experienced.  
 The entrepreneurs can be allocated to three groups with regard to their relational capital in the 
university organization. First, a number of entrepreneurs has high relational capital. This group 
includes tenured faculty members with a position in the university as full or associate professor. 
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Notably, these people have an important role in their department, also in terms of relationships with 
industry and funding performance. If these scholars start to exploit a technology (they invented 
themselves) in a new venture, they must negotiate a deal with the university about the transfer of this 
technology; this is an implication of the formal employment conditions. Here, national and university 
policies play a role – in particular, national law implying that intellectual property created during an 
employment contract is the employer‟s property. The second group of entrepreneurs, entrepreneurs 
with medium relational capital and a „middle‟ formal position, involves especially PhD students. PhD 
students are formally employed by the university, but only for four years and with the single goal of 
delivering a doctoral dissertation. These entrepreneurs started a new venture based on an invention 
which was part of their doctoral research. As such, they are part of the faculty, but without managerial 
tasks and only for a restricted period of time. Third, external entrepreneurs or MSc students exploiting 
a technology developed by someone else at the university are categorized as entrepreneurs with low 
relational capital and a „low‟ formal position.  
 Boolean searches in NVivo were used to check for co-occurrence of certain fairness rules and 
particular entrepreneur characteristics (i.e., entrepreneurial experience and relational capital) within 
one interview transcript – in line with Miles and Huberman‟s (1994) procedures regarding the use of 
tabular representations. This resulted in identifying patterns of how established fairness rules and 
identified specific fairness rules are used. 
 
Results 
This section describes the rules underlying the fairness perceptions of the entrepreneurs and examines 
to what extent these entrepreneurs draw on established fairness rules. In addition, individual 
characteristics (experience and relational capital) associated with the use of these rules are explored.  
-------------- Insert Table 2 and Table 3 about here -------------- 
 Specific Fairness Rules versus Established Rules 
Table 2 lists the specific fairness rules reported by the entrepreneurs. These rules are „specific‟ to the 
entrepreneurship setting and are not reflected in the established rules underlying the four fairness 
dimensions identified in previous studies. Table 2 also provides a definition of each rule and gives 
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examples of quotes. In this section, these rules are mentioned using a shorthand description. For 
example, the rule „Draw on practices at other universities to assess the fairness of the transaction with 
the university‟ is abbreviated as „other universities‟. The following nine specific rules are identified.  
 „Other universities‟ and „market norms‟ are rules in which the entrepreneurs use a different 
situation or scenario to compare their transaction with. The similarities or differences highlighted by 
this comparison serve to evaluate the fairness of the transaction. Sometimes, these market norms or 
practices at other universities are inferred from previous experiences, but in other cases market norms 
are based on public information or information received from others. For example, the founder of 
Sigma reported: 
At university X they say: „If there is a patent and you can reach a good agreement between 
the spin-off and the university, for instance royalties as a percentage of the revenue generated 
by the patent, that‟s okay. Then, we don‟t need to have a share in the spin-off.‟ But here they 
want both a royalty-agreement, in which they claim a part of the turnover, and they also want 
to have a share in the company. For me, that‟s out of the question, it‟s too much.   
 Other specific rules refer more to the negotiations and their content: „performance of the 
entrepreneur in the negotiations‟, „easiness and length of the negotiation‟, „venture control‟, and 
„future value of the venture‟. Especially „easiness and length of negotiation‟ surfaces as a rule that is 
used by more than half of the entrepreneurs. The easiness and length of the negotiations are important 
because long negotiations can delay other venture-related activities; moreover, long and difficult 
negotiations tend to bring about many frustrations along the way. For example, the founder of Gimel 
reported:  
Actually, I thought we had an agreement in June. We also had a letter of intent from a venture 
capitalist. The TTO wanted to invest as well. We also had an agreement over the patents. But, 
subsequently it still took half a year before the deal was actually finalized with the TTO. In 
the meantime, I already started with Gimel, on my own expenses. So, we were almost down 
and out when I finally could sign the contract. So, that was thrilling. (...) It finally turned out 
to be fine, but it was really not a nice experience. I certainly blame the TTO officer for this.  
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 Furthermore, „negotiator support‟, „cooperation and support by university‟, and „entitlement of the 
university‟ refer to the entity with whom the entrepreneurs negotiate. „Negotiator support‟ refers to 
the support by the negotiator(s) to the entrepreneur, while the rule about „cooperation and support by 
the university‟ refers to the cooperation with faculty, technology transfer officers and university 
employees in general. Especially cooperation and support by the university are important in forming 
fairness perceptions. Both rules are influenced by the entrepreneurs‟ expectations. The founder of Rho 
reported: 
In the back of your mind you know it is a negotiation. (...) But I didn‟t expect it to be so hard. 
The TTO director is very commercial. That is good for the TTO. But on the other hand, I 
think he is too commercially oriented (...) to deal extensively with startups. (...) Especially 
with boffins, they raise their hackles in this case.  
 In addition to the specific rules identified, Table 3 shows examples of the use of established rules. 
In particular, the rules underlying the procedural justice dimension are frequently reported, whereas 
the distributive and interpersonal fairness dimensions are also observed regularly. Procedural fairness 
here particularly refers to the consistency in applying procedures over time and across cases and the 
degree to which these procedures and negotiations are free of bias. Entrepreneurs evaluated 
procedural fairness positively when they experienced that university representatives acted according 
to the procedures and that the university did not exploit its powerful position to enforce an outcome 
favorable for them; in other words, negotiators acted free of bias. The founder of Omega argued: 
You easily get screwed [because] the university has the most powerful position. (...) It was a 
good thing they did not try to maximize their side of the deal, but considered the question: can 
we justify this deal to all stakeholders?  
Entrepreneurs evaluating procedural fairness negatively perceived procedures to be unclear or not 
consistently applied. Technology transfer officers are responsible for both the support and the 
contractual agreements. In some cases, entrepreneurs experienced this as problematic because they 
felt the support decisions were not free of bias, as the officers appeared to create a better deal for the 
university. 
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 Distributive fairness refers in these cases to assessing fairness based on what the entrepreneurs 
receive from the university in relation to what they pay for it. These payments are made in the form of 
venture equity, patent royalties or direct payments. In turn, the entrepreneurs receive support and are 
able to use university equipment, lab facilities and office space. Most importantly, they acquire the 
right to exploit intellectual property that is typically protected by a university-owned patent. 
Entrepreneurs who reported the distribution as fair evaluated the deal as acceptable because they got 
large returns on their „payment‟. Entrepreneurs that perceived the distribution as unfair reported they 
could not find sufficient justification for the particular equity position or royalty payments.  
 Interpersonal fairness is especially evident in case of mistrust of university officials‟ behavior in 
the negotiations, given their dual role with regard to support and agreements. For some entrepreneurs, 
this was the reason they mistrusted their counterpart in the negotiations. The founder of Epsilon 
reported: 
They do not step into the shoes of the entrepreneur. They just try to get a good deal for the 
university. I doubt their honesty in the negotiations. (...) That‟s a hard judgment, indeed.  
Informational fairness rules were less frequently reported. Informational fairness referred mainly to 
timely and tailored communication (see Table 3).  
 A comparison of Table 2 and Table 3 indicates that established procedural and distributive rules 
are used more frequently than specific rules. Table 4 indicates that this is probably an artifact of the 
„scattered‟ image created by the specific rules: each of these rules is in fact a single item construct, 
while the established four dimensions are multiple item constructs consisting of multiple rules (see 
Table 3). When all the rules are clustered as in Table 4, specific rules are slightly more frequently 
reported than established rules. Table 4 also demonstrates that most entrepreneurs use both specific 
and established rules, while the usage of specific and established rules hardly depends on a specific 
university context, given the similar patterns in the TU/e and WUR data. 
-------------- Insert Table 4 about here ------------------------ 
Specific Rules versus Established Rules Associated with Fair and Unfair Perceptions 
Table 5 reports the use of specific rules and established rules associated with „fair‟ or „unfair‟ 
perceptions of the transaction with the university. This analysis suggests that entrepreneurs draw on 
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specific rules as well as established rules to form both fair and unfair perceptions. Table 5 again 
shows that specific rules show a more „scattered‟ pattern. The results show small differences in rule 
usage between respondents who perceived the negotiations as fair and those perceiving the 
negotiations as unfair. The most important differences with regard to specific rules are as follows: 
„other universities‟, „venture control‟ and „entitlement university‟ are more frequently associated with 
unfair perceptions, whereas „performance of entrepreneur in negotiations‟, „negotiator support‟ and 
„cooperation and support by the university‟ tend to be related with fair perceptions. With regard to 
established rules, Table 5 suggests that distributive rules are more frequently associated with 
perceived unfairness. In general, all rules are used to form both fair and unfair perceptions, showing 
consistency in rule usage in this study. 
-------------- Insert Table 5 about here ----------------------- 
 To check the robustness of the findings, the influence of equity and royalty percentages in the 
contract between university and entrepreneur on perceived fairness was explored. Table 1 shows that 
high royalty percentages, and especially high university equity stakes, tend to be unrelated to 
perceptions of unfairness (e.g., Beta, Gamma, Delta, Zeta). Even the founder of Epsilon, who ended 
up with an agreement in which the university did not have any equity, perceived the university as 
unfair. Calculations of the average percentages for the group with fair perceptions and the one with 
unfair perceptions imply that ventures in both groups have comparable quantities of equity shares 
owned by the university (fair: 21% on average; unfair: 17% on average). So, actual equity and royalty 
percentages are not an efficient predictor of fairness perceptions. Rather, the perceived control is 
likely to be a more important predictor as the rule regarding venture control does have an effect on 
fairness perceptions (see Table 5). 
 
Fairness Rule Usage over Time 
To explore consistency in using specific and established fairness rules, Table 6 reports the rule usage 
for those cases in which at least two interviews over time were conducted. The first interview took 
place during the negotiations and the second interview after the negotiations were finished. The time 
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between both interviews was approximately 12 months. Table 6 points out that the usage of the 
fairness rules is consistent over time.  
-------------- Insert Table 6 and Table 7 about here ---------------------- 
Fairness Rules Associated with Entrepreneur Characteristics 
Table 7 reports the frequency with which particular groups of respondents employed specific rules 
and established rules. These results point at important differences between entrepreneurs in terms of 
experience and relational capital, suggesting that these characteristics are associated with the use of 
certain fairness rules.  
 With regard to specific rules, inexperienced entrepreneurs tended to refer more frequently to their 
own performance in the negotiations as well as to the easiness and length of the negotiation. 
Interestingly, the use of market norms is quite similar among experienced and inexperienced 
entrepreneurs. However, the precise content of the interview data coded into this category suggests 
that experienced entrepreneurs draw more on market norms from previous transactions they were 
involved in, whereas inexperienced entrepreneurs are more likely to use market norms based on social 
or public information.  
 Moreover, inexperienced entrepreneurs draw on the rule „cooperation and support by university‟ 
almost as frequently as their experienced counterparts. However, in-depth examination points out that 
experienced entrepreneurs use this rule more frequently to form a fair evaluation, whereas 
inexperienced entrepreneurs connect this rule more frequently to unfairness. Experienced 
entrepreneurs were prone to evaluate the university‟s wish for a certain equity position in terms of 
aligning different interests. For them, it also expressed commitment from the university. For example, 
the founder of Lambda argued:  
 It is also an important means to continue the cooperation with TU/e. If it turns out that we 
have something that generates a lot of profit, the university will also get a piece of the pie. 
That‟s very fair. Besides that, it‟s a lot more transparent this way. We also show that we are 
closely cooperating with the university.  
In contrast, the inexperienced entrepreneurs in our sample often complained that the university was 
not cooperative and not committed to their venture.  
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 With regard to established rules, the results show that inexperienced entrepreneurs referred more 
frequently to established rules of distributive, procedural and informational justice. Within the items 
coded for procedural fairness, the data suggest that inexperienced entrepreneurs referred more 
frequently to other (i.e., consistency among) cases than experienced entrepreneurs.  
 Also differences in relational capital (formal position) are associated with differences in rule 
usage. The most important differences are observed between entrepreneurs with high relational capital 
on the one hand and entrepreneurs with medium and low relational capital on the other hand. 
Entrepreneurs with high relational capital used „market norms‟, „easiness and length of negotiation‟ 
and „cooperation and support by university‟ less frequently, whereas they more frequently drew on 
rules regarding „negotiator support‟ and „venture control‟. The founder of Theta reflected as follows 
on the negotiations: 
I would never accept the university as a majority equity-owner again. (...) They could, maybe, 
have like 40% of the shares but would never be majority owner again.  
 
Discussion 
This study aims to provide a more in-depth understanding of fairness as a key factor affecting 
entrepreneur-university cooperation. To understand how those entrepreneurs form fairness 
perceptions, this study explored the fairness rules that they employ, and assessed how the use of 
entrepreneurship-specific fairness rules complements the use of established fairness rules described in 
the literature. This section discusses the main findings and their implications.  
 
Complementary Rules 
Our empirical findings suggest that established fairness rules are applicable to the formation of 
fairness perceptions by entrepreneurs cooperating with a university. Especially the procedural fairness 
rules are frequently employed, which confirms that focusing on procedural fairness is a good proxy 
for measuring overall fairness perceptions (Akgün, Keskin and Byrne 2010; Busenitz, Moesel, Fiet 
and Barney 1997; Busenitz, Fiet and Moesel 2004; Sapienza and Korsgaard 1996). However, our 
results also demonstrate that established fairness rules do not cover all aspects of the formation of 
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fairness perceptions by entrepreneurs regarding their cooperation with a university (see Ariño and 
Ring 2010). Some rules specific to this entrepreneurship setting appear to be missing in current 
operationalizations of fairness, and thus extend and complement the four fairness dimensions 
previously established in the literature. 
 Two specific rules can possibly be included in the distributive fairness dimension, namely 
„negotiator support‟ and „cooperation and support by university‟, if support is viewed as a resource 
provided in the exchange relationship (see Colquitt 2001). Our results show that these rules are 
associated with differences in fairness evaluations. Thus, these specific rules are important measures 
of resources provided by the university in the exchange relationship, which could be used to measure 
distributive fairness in the context of relationships between entrepreneurs and universities. Note that 
these specific rules, and also the „entitlement university‟ rule, consider the university as the „larger 
entity‟ entrepreneurs are dealing with. This confirms earlier findings that rules regarding the entity are 
important (Hollensbe, Khazanchi and Masterson 2008) and that new venturing processes are 
influenced by the university‟s actions to enhance clarity in procedures (Ambos, Mäkelä, Birkinshaw 
and D‟Este 2008; Vohora, Wright and Lockett 2004). „Entitlement university‟, however, is difficult to 
connect with any of the established fairness dimensions. There is no category dealing with 
expectations or entitlement, while the distributive fairness construct only evaluates the ratio of outputs 
versus inputs. Further investigation is needed to determine whether and how this rule can be 
considered as part of one of the established dimensions. 
 The specific fairness rules „other universities‟ and „market norms‟ can be considered as 
complementary to the distributive and procedural fairness dimensions. These specific rules show that 
the entrepreneurs in our study not only use the rule of distributive fairness to evaluate contributions 
and benefits and the rule of consistency across similar cases (which belongs to the dimension of 
procedural fairness), but also compare with more distant reference transactions – which is not 
included in Colquitt‟s (2001) conceptualization. As such, these two specific rules surface as 
complementary context-specific procedural fairness rules by which the entrepreneurs evaluate their 
case by a social comparison process. This implies that future research assessing fairness perceptions 
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of entrepreneurs should include consider the perceived consistency with market transactions or with 
other reference transactions to enhance established measurements of procedural fairness.  
 The specific rule of „easiness and length of negotiation‟ is another process-related rule is not 
reflected in the Colquitt (2001) conceptualization of procedural fairness. The frequent usage of this 
rule and its association with both fair and unfair perceptions suggest, however, that duration effects 
are important. This is in line with earlier research on entrepreneurs (Steffensen, Rogers and Speakman 
2000). Such a duration effect of the negotiation process uncovers a new aspect of fairness evaluations. 
Existing studies have observed effects of negotiation duration, such as the effect of deadlines on the 
number of offers (Lim and Murnighan 1994), but effects on fairness perceptions have not been 
previously observed. This finding suggests that, in addition to consistency in procedures, the duration 
of these procedures matters. This rule can also enhance understanding and measuring the formation of 
fairness perceptions of negotiations. As such, this rule constitutes an important complement to other 
rules in the procedural justice dimension.  
  
Unique Rules for Entrepreneur-University Cooperation 
The results also show a number of rules which are difficult to connect to the established fairness 
dimensions and may be unique to the university-entrepreneurship setting. The first unique rule is the 
„performance of the entrepreneur in negotiations‟. In particular inexperienced entrepreneurs tend to 
use their own performance as a reference point. This fairness rule is not covered by any of the 
established dimensions. It could be related to overconfidence and the control focus of entrepreneurs 
(Busenitz and Barney 1997; Mueller and Thomas 2001) and thus may be specific to entrepreneurship.  
 Unforeseeable uncertainty and the importance of venture control are specific characteristics of the 
entrepreneurship setting (Loch, Solt and Bailey 2008; Shane 2003). These characteristics also surface 
in specific fairness rules which are difficult to connect to the established organizational justice 
dimensions. Unforeseeable uncertainty is reflected in the fairness rule „future value‟, as the amount of 
future value that still has to be created is unknown and is contingent on unknown future events. The 
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frequent usage of this rule indicates that many entrepreneurs are concerned about the estimation of 
future value and the distribution of appropriation rights.  
 The fairness rule „venture control‟ is often associated with unfair perceptions, implying that 
perceived venture control indeed does influence fairness assessments (see Alvarez and Parker 2009; 
Jensen and Thursby 2001). Here, our study contributes to the fairness literature by showing that 
perceived rather than actual control is associated with fairness perceptions.  
 
Individual Entrepreneur Characteristics 
An important individual characteristic influencing rule usage is the experience of the entrepreneur. 
This finding extends earlier findings regarding the effect of entrepreneurial experience and the 
resulting cooperative behavior (see Busenitz, Moesel, Fiet and Barney 1997; Dew, Read, Sarasvathy 
and Wiltbank 2009; Lee and Tsang 2001) by specifying how these fairness perceptions are 
constructed differently by experienced and inexperienced entrepreneurs. Studies on university-related 
entrepreneurship concluded that the experience of founders is an important predictor of performance 
in this context (Franklin, Wright and Lockett 2001; Grandi and Grimaldi 2005; Van Burg, Romme, 
Gilsing and Reymen 2008). Our study explains on the micro-level how experience may influence 
performance through the formation of perceptions of fairness. Inexperienced entrepreneurs refer more 
often to their own performance than experienced entrepreneurs (see Table 7), resulting more 
frequently in unfair perceptions by inexperienced entrepreneurs (see Table 5). Although the reference 
to own performance during the negotiations is a self-efficacy effect, consistent with attribution theory 
(Gilliland 1993; Ployhart and Ryan 1997), this effect is not systematically included in previous 
fairness studies. Our results suggest that this attribution effect is especially important for 
inexperienced entrepreneurs, possibly because their perceptions are more easily influenced by new 
experiences. Moreover, inexperienced entrepreneurs seem to search for more information to gain 
control over the situation, especially reflected in informational fairness (see Table 7), and the 
perceived lack of (timely) information is associated with unfair perceptions (see Table 5).  
 Another important individual characteristic is the relational capital of the entrepreneur in the 
university. The results extend earlier findings that entrepreneurs with high relational capital (indicated 
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by higher formal positions) in universities, such as professors, are more inclined to accept the 
procedures of the incumbent organization (Bercovitz and Feldman 2008; George et al. 2006). Our 
results show how relational capital and formal positions precisely impact the formation of fairness 
perceptions by entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs with high relational capital do not refer to other 
universities or market transactions, nor use interpersonal and information fairness rules as frequent as 
entrepreneurs with lower levels of relational capital such as PhD or graduate students (see Table 7). 
However, given that these entrepreneurs have an established relationship with the university, they are 
also likely to have high expectations regarding the TTO‟s support as expressed in the „negotiator 
support‟ rule, which is associated with fair evaluations (see Table 5 and 7). Moreover, our results 
suggest that entrepreneurs with high formal positions expect that they will get a substantial say in the 
venture, in particular in terms of control and ownership (see „venture control‟ in Table 7). This 
extends earlier studies on governance of new ventures (Alvarez and Parker 2009; Alvarez and Barney 
2005), by identifying differences in the amount of relational capital of entrepreneurs. An endowment 
effect (see Thaler 1980) appears to be at work here: the research efforts they have engaged in over a 
longer period of time may lead to a rise of their expectations of ownership of the invention.  
 In contrast, entrepreneurs with lower levels of relational capital in the university tend to search for 
external reference points to assess the fairness of the university, such as practices at other universities 
and market norms. They also employ more additional fairness rules, implying they are trying to 
underpin their assessment of the transaction with the university in great detail. Especially perceived 
cooperation with the university appears to be critical in this case. Some of these additional fairness 
rules are more associated with fair perceptions, such as „cooperation and support by university‟, while 
others are associated with unfair evaluations, such as distributive and informational fairness rules (see 
Table 5). This exploration suggests that relational capital impacts the formation of fairness 
perceptions, thus adding an important new insight to the existing knowledge regarding entrepreneur-
university cooperation, as most studies do not take relational capital effects into account.  
 
Generalizability, Limitations and Future Research  
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The results of this study evidently apply to the context of the cooperation between entrepreneurs and a 
university to commercialize university-owned technology. A very similar setting is the cooperation 
between large corporations and their spin-offs. In these contexts, cooperation is important and the 
relationship is characterized by unequal power distribution. Our findings may also apply to other 
settings with these characteristics, such as relationships between entrepreneurs and investors such as 
venture capitalists, and between biotech entrepreneurs and large pharmaceutical firms. However, the 
relational capital effect may operate differently in those contexts, because the incumbent 
entrepreneurs are not initially embedded in the host organization. 
 This study comes with a number of limitations. First, the inductive nature of our research design 
limits its external validity. Strictly speaking, the findings only carry validity for fairness perceptions 
of entrepreneurs with regard to their host university. Moreover, fairness perceptions can be different 
in other cultures. Therefore, it is important to explore whether the fairness conceptualizations 
identified in this article also hold in different cultural settings. Future work needs to test the use of the 
complementary and unique fairness rules in other settings and on a larger scale. Second, we were not 
able to analyze in much detail the dynamics of fairness rules and fairness perceptions over a longer 
period. Third, some specific rules need further refinement. For instance, the „venture control‟ rule 
may be studied in more detail by distinguishing between degree of ownership, control rights, 
shareholders‟ interests and dilution provisions.  
 
Conclusions  
Studies of entrepreneur–university cooperation have demonstrated that (un)fairness perceptions by 
entrepreneurs impact the degree of cooperation and learning in this relationship. Current 
understandings of the formation of these fairness perceptions and their effect on cooperation draw on 
established organizational justice theory developed in the employer-employee setting. This study was 
set up to develop a better understanding of entrepreneur-university cooperation and explored which 
rules guide the formation of fairness perceptions in the cooperation between entrepreneurs and 
universities. This constitutes an important void in the literature because this context differs from 
regular organizational settings in view of unforeseeable uncertainty and the importance of venture 
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control. Nine entrepreneurship-specific fairness rules were identified that are used to form fairness 
perceptions, in addition and complementary to established rules. Furthermore, fairness formation 
appears to be influenced by entrepreneurial experience and the entrepreneur‟s relational capital within 
the university. As such, this study provides a better understanding of how entrepreneurs with varying 
positions and levels of experience construct fairness perceptions in cooperating with a university. In 
fact, fairness perceptions may explain why entrepreneurs‟ cooperative behavior may differ from what 
is expected from a „rational economic‟ point of view, for instance by explaining why entrepreneurs 
unexpectedly show uncooperative behavior (Kim and Mauborgne 1998; Pillutla and Murnighan 
1996). In this way, our study uncovers one of the key mechanisms leading to (un)cooperative 
behavior of entrepreneurs. The rules identified in this study provide clues for entrepreneurs who wish 
to effectively cooperate with universities as well as with other organizations, and vice versa.  
 This research has practical implications for technology commercialization processes at 
universities. The identified fairness rules can guide the design of procedures and practices that 
increase and maintain fairness perceived by entrepreneurs and thus build effective cooperative 
relationships. Special attention should be paid to the easiness and length of the negotiations, several 
aspects of cooperation and support, and the appreciation of the future value of the company. 
Technology transfer officers should be aware of differences between entrepreneurs, in particular 
regarding the level of experience and relational capital. Overall, this study suggests that a sustained 
effort to enhance perceptions of fairness will pay off. Positive fairness perceptions facilitate an open 
exchange between entrepreneurs and universities, which in turn is instrumental in effectively 
commercializing university technology. 
 
Acknowledgements 
We thank the editor, an anonymous reviewer, Mariann Jelinek, Fred Langerak, Niels Noorderhaven, 
Scott Shane and participants of the Academy of Management 2010 meeting for their helpful 
comments on earlier versions of this study. Partial financial support for this manuscript was provided 
by TU/e Innovation Lab of Eindhoven University of Technology. 
 28 
References 
 
Ahrweiler, Petra, Andreas Pyka and Nigel Gilbert. 2011. “A new model for university-industry links 
in knowledge-based economies.” Journal of Product Innovation Management 28 (2): 218-35. 
Akgün, Ali E., Halit Keskin and John C. Byrne. 2010. “Procedural justice climate in new product 
development teams: Antecedents and consequences.” Journal of Product Innovation Management 
27 (7): 1096-111. 
Alvarez, Sharon and Simon Parker. 2009. “Emerging firms and the allocation of control rights: A 
bayesian approach.” Academy of Management Review 34 (2): 209-27. 
Alvarez, Sharon A. and Jay B. Barney. 2005. “How do entrepreneurs organize firms under conditions 
of uncertainty?” Journal of Management 31 (5): 776-93. 
Ambos, Tina C., Kristiina Mäkelä, Julian Birkinshaw and Pablo D‟Este. 2008. “When does university 
research get commercialized? Creating ambidexterity in research institutions.” Journal of 
Management Studies 45 (8): 1424-47. 
Ariño, Africa and Peter Smith Ring. 2010. “The role of fairness in alliance formation.” Strategic 
Management Journal 31: 1054-87. 
Bercovitz, Janet and Maryann Feldman. 2008. “Academic entrepreneurs: Organizational change at the 
individual level.” Organization Science 19 (1): 69-89. 
Bies, Robert J. and Joseph S. Moag. 1986. “Interactional justice: Communication criteria of fairness.” 
In Research on negotiation in organizations, edited by Roy J. Lewicki, Blair H. Sheppard and Max 
H. Bazerman, 43-55. Greenwich (CT): JAI Press. 
Blount, Sally and Richard P. Larrick. 2000. “Framing the game: Examining frame choice in 
bargaining.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 81 (1): 43-71. 
Breznitz, Shiri M., Rory P. O‟Shea and Thomas J. Allen. 2008. “University commercialization 
strategies in the development of regional bioclusters.” Journal of Product Innovation Management 
25 (2): 129-42. 
Brockhaus, Robert H. and Pamela S. Horowitz. 1986. “The psychology of the entrepreneur.” In The 
art and science of entrepreneurship, edited by Donald L. Sexton and Raymond W. Smilor, 25-48. 
Cambridge, MA: Ballinger. 
Bstieler, Ludwig. 2006. “Trust formation in collaborative new product development.” Journal of 
Product Innovation Management 23 (1): 56-72. 
Burmeister, Katrin and Christian Schade. 2007. “Are entrepreneurs‟ decisions more biased? An 
experimental investigation of the susceptibility to status quo bias.” Journal of Business Venturing 
22 (3): 340-362. 
Busenitz, Lowell W. and Jay B. Barney. 1997. “Differences between entrepreneurs and managers in 
large organizations: Biases and heuristics in strategic decision-making.” Journal of Business 
Venturing 12 (1): 9-30. 
Busenitz, Lowell W., James O. Fiet and Douglas D. Moesel. 2004. “Reconsidering the venture 
capitalists‟ “value added” proposition: An interorganizational learning perspective.” Journal of 
Business Venturing 19 (6): 787-807. 
Busenitz, Lowell W., Douglas D. Moesel, James O. Fiet and Jay B. Barney. 1997. “The framing of 
perceptions of fairness in the relationship between venture capitalists and new venture teams.” 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 21 (3): 5-21. 
Butterfield, Kenneth D., Linda Klebe Trevino and Gail A. Ball. 1996. “Punishment from the 
manager‟s perspective: A grounded investigation and inductive model.” Academy of Management 
Journal 39 (6): 1479-512. 
Clarysse, Bart, Mike Wright, Andy Lockett, Els Van de Velde and Ajay Vohora. 2005. “Spinning out 
new ventures: A typology of incubation strategies from European research institutions.” Journal of 
Business Venturing 20 (2): 183-216. 
Colquitt, Jason A. 2001. “On the dimensionality of organizational justice: A construct validation of a 
measure.” Journal of Applied Psychology 86 (3): 386-400. 
Colquitt, Jason A., Donald E. Conlon, Michael J. Wesson, Christopher O. L. H. Porter and K. Yee Ng. 
2001. “Justice at the millennium: A meta-analytic review of 25 years of organizational justice 
research.” Journal of Applied Psychology 86 (3): 425-45. 
 29 
Colyvas, Jeannette A. 2007. “From divergent meanings to common practices: The early 
institutionalization of technology transfer in the life sciences at Stanford University.” Research 
Policy 36 (4): 456-76. 
Daellenbach, Urs S. and Sally J. Davenport. 2004. “Establishing trust during the formation of 
technology alliances.” Journal of Technology Transfer 29 (2): 187-202. 
Davidsson, Per. 2004. Researching entrepreneurship. New York: Springer. 
De Cleyn, Sven H. and Johan Braet. 2008. “IPR in joint research projects: Evidence from practice.” 
Journal of Private Equity 12 (1): 76-84. 
Dechenaux, Emmanuel, Brent Goldfarb, Scott Shane and Marie Thursby. 2008. “Appropriability and 
commercialization: Evidence from MIT inventions.” Management Science 54 (5): 893-906. 
Dew, Nicholas, Stuart Read, Saras D. Sarasvathy and Robert Wiltbank. 2009. “Effectual versus 
predictive logics in entrepreneurial decision-making: Differences between experts and novices.” 
Journal of Business Venturing 24 (4): 287-309. 
Djokovic, Djordje and Vangelis Souitaris. 2008. “Spinouts from academic institutions: A literature 
review with suggestions for further research.” Journal of Technology Transfer 33 (3): 225-47. 
Feldman, Maryann, Irwin Feller, Janet Bercovitz and Richard Burton. 2002. “Equity and the 
technology transfer strategies of American research universities.” Management Science 48 (1): 
105-21. 
Fini, Riccardo, Rosa Grimaldi and Maurizio Sobrero. 2009. “Factors fostering academics to start up 
new ventures: An assessment of Italian founders incentives.” Journal of Technology Transfer 34 
(4): 380-402. 
Franklin, Stephen J., Mike Wright and Andy Lockett. 2001. “Academic and surrogate entrepreneurs 
in university spin-out companies.” Journal of Technology Transfer 26 (1-2): 127-41. 
George, Elizabeth, Prithviraj Chattopadhyay, Sim B. Sitkin and Jeff Barden. 2006. “Cognitive 
underpinnings of institutional persistence and change: A framing perspective.” Academy of 
Management Review 31 (2): 347-65. 
George, Gerard, Shaker A. Zahra and D. Robley Wood. 2002. “The effects of business–university 
alliances on innovative output and financial performance: A study of publicly traded 
biotechnology companies.” Journal of Business Venturing 17 (6): 577-609. 
Gilliland, Stephen W. 1993. “The perceived fairness of selection systems: An organizational justice 
perspective.” Academy of Management Review 18 (4): 694-734. 
Grandi, Alessandro and Rosa Grimaldi. 2005. “Academics‟ organizational characteristics and the 
generation of successful business ideas.” Journal of Business Venturing 20 (6): 821-45. 
Greeno, James G. and Herbert A. Simon. 1988. “Problem solving and reasoning.” In Stevens’ 
handbook of experimental psychology, edited by R. C. Atkinson, R. J. Hernstein, G. Lindzey and 
R. Duncan, 589-673. New York: Wiley. 
Greenwood, Royston and C. R. Hinings. 1996. “Understanding radical organizational change: 
Bringing together the old and the new institutionalism.” Academy of Management Review 21 (4): 
1022-54. 
Hollensbe, Elaine C., Shalini Khazanchi and Suzanne S. Masterson. 2008. “How do I assess if my 
supervisor and organization are fair? Identifying the rules underlying entity-based justice 
perceptions.” Academy of Management Journal 51 (6): 1099-116. 
Husted, Bryan W. and Robert Folger. 2004. “Fairness and transaction costs: The contribution of 
organizational justice theory to an integrative model of economic organizations.” Organization 
Science 15 (6): 719-29. 
Jensen, Richard and Marie Thursby. 2001. “Proofs and prototypes for sale: The licensing of university 
inventions.” American Economic Review 91 (1): 240-259. 
Jick, Todd D. 1979. “Mixing qualitative and quantitative methods: Triangulation in action.” 
Administrative Science Quarterly 24 (4): 602-11. 
Kahneman, Daniel. 1992. “Reference points, anchors, norms, and mixed feelings.” Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes 51 (2): 296-312. 
Kim, W. Chan and Renee Mauborgne. 1998. “Procedural justice, strategic decision making, and the 
knowledge economy.” Strategic Management Journal 19 (4): 323-38. 
Kirzner, Israel M. 1989. Discovery, capitalism, and distributive justice. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
 30 
-----. 2002. “Comment on “A critique of Kirzner‟s finders-keepers defense of profit”.” Review of 
Austrian Economics 15 (1): 91-94. 
Kray, Laura J. and Allan E. Lind. 2002. “The injustices of others: Social reports and the integration of 
others‟ experiences in organizational justice judgments.” Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes 89 (1): 906-24. 
Lee, Don Y. and Eric W. K. Tsang. 2001. “The effects of entrepreneurial personality, background and 
network activities on venture growth.” Journal of Management Studies 38 (4): 583-602. 
Lee, Thomas W. 1999. Using qualitative methods in organizational research. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications. 
Lehner, Johannes M. 2000. “Shifts of reference points for framing of strategic decisions and changing 
risk-return associations.” Management Science 46 (1): 63-76. 
Leonard-Barton, Dorothy. 1990. “A dual methodology for case studies: Synergistic use of a 
longitudinal single site with replicated multiple sites.” Organization Science 1 (3): 248-66. 
Lim, Stephen Ghee-Soon and J. Keith Murnighan. 1994. “Phases, deadlines, and the bargaining 
process.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 58 (2): 153-71. 
Lind, Allan E. and Tom R. Tyler. 1988. The social psychology of procedural justice. New York: 
Plenum Press. 
Loch, Christoph H., Michael E. Solt and Elaine M. Bailey. 2008. “Diagnosing unforeseeable 
uncertainty in a new venture.” Journal of Product Innovation Management 25 (1): 28-46. 
Lockett, Andy, Mike Wright and Stephen Franklin. 2003. “Technology transfer and universities‟ spin-
out strategies.” Small Business Economics 20 (2): 185-200. 
Miles, Matthew B. and A. Michael Huberman. 1994. Qualitative data analysis: An expanded 
sourcebook. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Molm, Linda D, Nobuyuki Takahashi and Gretchen Peterson. 2003. “In the eye of the beholder: 
Procedural justice in social exchange.” American Sociological Review 68 (1): 128-52. 
Mueller, Stephen L. and Anisya S. Thomas. 2001. “Culture and entrepreneurial potential: A nine 
country study of locus of control and innovativeness.” Journal of Business Venturing 16 (1): 51-
75. 
Nicolaou, Nicos and Sue Birley. 2003. “Academic networks in a trichotomous categorisation of 
university spinouts.” Journal of Business Venturing 18 (3): 333-59. 
Ordonez, Lisa D., Terry Connolly and Richard Coughlan. 2000. “Multiple reference points in 
satisfaction and fairness assessment.” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 13 (3): 329-44. 
Pillutla, Madan M. and J. Keith Murnighan. 1996. “Unfairness, anger, and spite: Emotional rejections 
of ultimatum offers.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 68 (3): 208-24. 
Ployhart, Robert E. and Ann Marie Ryan. 1997. “Toward an explanation of applicant reactions: An 
examination of organizational justice and attribution frameworks.” Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes 72 (3): 308-35. 
Rappert, Brian, Andrew Webster and David Charles. 1999. “Making sense of diversity and reluctance: 
Academic-industrial relations and intellectual property.” Research Policy 28 (8): 873-90. 
Reuer, Jeffrey J. and Africa Ariño. 2002. “Contractual renegotiations in strategic alliances.” Journal 
of Management 28 (1): 47-68. 
Rothaermel, Frank T., Shanti D. Agung and Lin Jiang. 2007. “University entrepreneurship: A 
taxonomy of the literature.” Industrial and Corporate Change 16 (4): 691-791. 
Sapienza, Harry J. and M. Audrey Korsgaard. 1996. “Procedural justice in entrepreneur-investor 
relations.” Academy of Management Journal 39 (3): 544-74. 
Shane, Scott. 2001. “Technological opportunities and new firm creation.” Management Science 47 
(2): 205-20. 
-----. 2002. “Selling university technology: Patterns from MIT.” Management Science 48 (1): 122-37. 
-----. 2003. A general theory of entrepreneurship: The individual opportunity nexus. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar. 
-----. 2004. Academic entrepreneurship: University spinoffs and wealth creation. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar. 
Shepherd, Dean A. and Andrew Zacharakis. 2001. “The venture capitalist-entrepreneur relationship: 
Control, trust and confidence in co-operative behaviour.” Venture Capital 3 (2): 129-49. 
 31 
Sherwood, Arthur Lloyd and Jeffrey G. Covin. 2008. “Knowledge acquisition in university-industry 
alliances: An empirical investigation from a learning theory perspective.” Journal of Product 
Innovation Management 25 (2): 162-79. 
Siegel, Donald S., Reinhilde Veugelers and Mike Wright. 2007. “Technology transfer offices and 
commercialization of university intellectual property: performance and policy implications.” 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 23 (4): 640-660. 
Siegel, Donald S., David A. Waldman, Leanne E. Atwater and Albert N. Link. 2004. “Toward a 
model of the effective transfer of scientific knowledge from academicians to practitioners: 
Qualitative evidence from the commercialization of university technologies.” Journal of 
Engineering and Technology Management 21 (1-2): 115-42. 
Sommer, Svenja C. and Christoph H. Loch. 2004. “Selectionism and learning in projects with 
complexity and unforeseeable uncertainty.” Management Science 50 (10): 1334-47. 
Song, Michael, Ksenia Podoynitsyna, Hans van der Bij and Johannes I. M. Halman. 2008. “Success 
factors in new ventures: A meta-analysis.” Journal of Product Innovation Management 25 (1): 7-
27. 
Steffensen, Morten, Everett M. Rogers and Kristen Speakman. 2000. “Spin-offs from research centers 
at a research university.” Journal of Business Venturing 15 (1): 93-111. 
Stevens, John M. and John W. Bagby. 2001. “Knowledge transfer from universities to business: 
Returns for all stakeholders?” Organization 8 (2): 259-68. 
Taylor, Mark P. 1996. “Earnings, independence or unemployment: Why become self-employed?” 
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 58 (2): 253-66. 
Thaler, Richard. 1980. “Toward a positive theory of consumer choice.” Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization 1 (1): 39-60. 
Tyler, Tom R. and Steven L. Blader. 2003. “The group engagement model: Procedural justice, social 
identity, and cooperative behavior.” Personality and Social Psychology Review 7 (4): 349-61. 
Un, C. Annique, Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra and Kazuhiro Asakawa. 2010. “R&D collaborations and 
product innovation.” Journal of Product Innovation Management 27 (5): 673-89. 
Van Burg, Elco, A. Georges L. Romme, Victor A. Gilsing and Isabelle M. M. J. Reymen. 2008. 
“Creating university spin-offs: A science-based design perspective.” Journal of Product 
Innovation Management 25 (2): 114-28. 
van den Bos, Kees, E. Allan Lind and Henk A. M. Wilke. 2001. “The psychology of procedural and 
distributive juistice viewed from the perspective of fairness heuristics theory.” In Justice in the 
workplace, edited by Russell Cropanzano, 49-66. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Vohora, Ajay, Mike Wright and Andy Lockett. 2004. “Critical junctures in the development of 
university high-tech spinout companies.” Research Policy 33 (1): 147-75. 
Welsh, Rick, Leland Glenna, William Lacy and Dina Biscotti. 2008. “Close enough but not too far: 
Assessing the effects of university-industry research relationships and the rise of academic 
capitalism.” Research Policy 37 (10): 1854-64. 
 
 
 32 
Table 1 
Cases, Data Collection and Fairness Perceptions 
  
Name Interviews 
Relational 
Capital Experience  
University Equity 
Shares and Royalties Fairness Evaluation 
      
TU/e      
Alpha 1 Low High <10% + royalties Fair 
Beta 2 Low High 20%-30% Fair 
Gamma 1 High High 50-60% Fair 
Delta 1 Low High 30%-40% + royalties Fair 
Epsilon 2 Low High None Unfair 
Zeta 2 Low Low 90-100% Fair 
Eta 1 Low High 10-20% Unfair 
Theta 1 High High 90-100% Unfair 
Kappa 1 High High None Fair 
Lambda 1 Middle High <10% Fair 
Mu 1 Low Low <10% Fair 
Xi 1 Middle Low <10% Fair 
Rho 2 Middle Low <10% Unfair 
Sigma 3 Middle Low <10% + royalties Unfair 
Tau 3 Middle Low <10% + royalties Fair 
Upsilon 1 Middle High None Fair 
Phi 1 Middle Low None Unfair 
Psi 1 Middle Low 50%-60% Fair 
Omega 3 Low Low 10%-20% Fair 
      
WUR      
Aleph 1 High High None Unfair 
Beth 1 High High None Fair 
Gimel 1 High Low 40%-50% Unfair 
Daleth 1 Middle Low None Fair 
Vau 1 Middle High None Fair 
Yod 1 Low Low None Unfair 
Lamed 1 Low Low None Unfair 
      
 33 
Table 2 
Specific Rules Used by Academic Entrepreneurs to Form Fairness Perceptions 
 
Specific Rule 
(Abbreviated) 
Number 
(Percentage) of 
Respondents 
Reporting Rule Description Sample Quotes 
    
Other universities 9(38) Draw on practices at other universities to assess 
the fairness of the transaction with the university.  
I have talked with other entrepreneurs, who negotiated with other universities. What I learned is that it‟s really 
unfair and impossible at other universities. I‟m very happy I have started from this university. (...) And I think this 
university is constructive, more than other universities. (Alpha, translated) 
Market norms 12(50) Use a transaction in the market to assess the 
fairness of the transaction with the university. 
They [the TTO] ask some serious offers. Especially when you experience what your idea is worth in the venture 
capital market, you start to think: you are just a son of a bitch that you ask so much. (Epsilon, translated) 
Performance of 
entrepreneur in 
negotiations 
4(17) Use my performance during the negotiations to 
assess the fairness of the transaction with the 
university.  
We got a really good deal. It was good that TU/e got the impression that they shouldn‟t push us too hard, as they 
expected we otherwise would withdraw. [laughing] In that respect, we played it very well. (Omega, translated) 
Negotiator support 7(33) Use the level of support by the (TTO) negotiator 
during negotiations to assess the fairness of the 
transaction with the university. 
I expected that a TTO would provide support to start a new venture. But they didn‟t do that at all. They only 
positioned themselves as a negotiator on behalf of the university. (Gimel, translated) 
Easiness and length 
of negotiation  
13(54) Use the length and easiness of negotiations to 
assess the fairness of the transaction with the 
university. 
This 10% equity participation was settled quickly. We can negotiate very long to make it 9 or 11 percent, but that 
does not matter eventually. (...) We actually did not mess around too much about one or two percent. I think that 
that was good, because both parties now feel very good and this also influences [the cooperation]. (Xi, translated) 
Cooperation and 
support by 
university  
17(71) Use the degree of support of and cooperation with 
the university in general to assess the fairness of 
the transaction with the university. 
You better have a good basis, that TU/e is supporting you, and that the researchers cooperate. This maybe results in 
a different distribution, in which there is less left for yourself. But it gives a broader base to continue [with the 
venture]. (Omega, translated) 
Venture control  10(38) Use the degree of venture control by the university 
to assess the fairness of the transaction with the 
university.  
Even if TU/e has a minority participation, they can make it immensely hard if they want, with the entire bunch of 
lawyers they have. I just don‟t want this within my company. (Phi, translated) 
Future value 11(46) Use potential future value or revenues of the 
venture to assess the fairness of the transaction 
with the university. 
We pay something like 5% of royalties over the profit, with a maximum of 200K Euro. But if we start paying this, 
we talk about such huge amounts of money [that we are gaining]... At that moment, I couldn‟t care less. They may 
get their 200K. Very easy. (...) At the moment that we make these large profits, it is fair to bring something back in 
this way. At the moment that [it] does not happen [making profits], it is a pity for both parties. (Delta, translated) 
Entitlement 
university 
6(25) Use my normative position regarding university 
commercialization practices to assess the fairness 
of the transaction with the university. 
I think it is stupid that I had to negotiate with the university. I think that the principle is wrong. (...) The university 
should have said: „You know what? We will just give you the technology for a symbolic fee.‟ The university does 
not need to make profit, do they? (Epsilon, translated) 
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Table 3 
Established Rules Used by Academic Entrepreneurs to Form Fairness Perceptions 
Established 
Fairness 
Dimension 
Number 
(Percentage) of 
Respondents 
Reporting Rules 
of this Dimension 
Established Rules Underlying the Fairness Dimension 
(Adapted from Colquitt, 2001) Sample Quotes 
    
Distributive 17(71) Determine the balance between my (venture‟s) contributions and benefits (in terms of effort, 
equity, royalties, access to facilities, direct payments, etc) to assess the fairness of the transaction 
with the university. 
Then I started to make an inventory of what it all would cost 
[that I was using from the university]. We attached a sum to 
that. When Phi starts to really run, I will pay it back. At this 
moment, it is a subordinated loan. I can live with that, that‟s 
fair: I use something, so I pay this back. (Phi, translated) 
Procedural 19(79) The following rules refer to the procedures used to arrive at the contract. Evaluate the extent to 
which: 
- I have been able to express views and feelings during the procedures; 
- I had influence over the contract arrived at by the procedures; 
- the procedures have been applied consistently; 
- the procedures have been free of bias; 
- the procedures have been based on accurate information; 
- I have been able to appeal the contract arrived at by the procedures; 
- the procedures upheld ethical and moral standards;  
to assess the fairness of the transaction with the university. 
Free of bias: I feel it is double, I don‟t want to ask TU/e for 
advice, because they give the kind of advice and support that 
is gives them a better [negotiation] result. I don‟t think that‟s a 
good thing. (Sigma, translated) 
 
Consistent application of procedures: Other entrepreneurs, 
who add less value themselves, get better deals. Very honestly 
speaking. (Tau, translated) 
Interpersonal 12(50) The following rules refer to the university representative responsible for the negotiations. 
Evaluate the extent to which: 
- he/she has treated one in a polite manner; 
- he/she has treated one with dignity; 
- he/she has treated one with respect; 
- he/she has refrained from improper remarks or comments; 
to assess the fairness of the transaction with the university. 
Respect: Finally, it was hard bargaining. When I would have 
known that from the start, I would have started negotiating 
differently. (....) And I would like to question if the university 
really needs to negotiate that hard with her start-ups. (...) The 
way they did it could have been more respectful. (Rho, 
translated) 
Informational 7(29) The following rules refer to the to the university representative responsible for the negotiations. 
Evaluate the extent to which: 
- he/she has been candid in his/her communications; 
- he/she explained the procedures thoroughly; 
- his/her explanations regarding the procedures were reasonable; 
- he/she communicated details in a timely manner; 
- he/she seemed to tailor his/her communications to individuals‟ specific needs; 
to assess the fairness of the transaction with the university. 
Timely communication: It is very unclear, I don‟t see a 
standardized process, I should say. Everything should come 
from our side. We now started to negotiate with TU/e about 
the license. And we also got the feeling that we should start 
negotiating about an equity participation. But again, they don‟t 
inform us: let‟s start talking about that. We should apparently 
initiate that ourselves. (Rho, translated) 
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Table 4 
Specific Fairness Rules versus Established Fairness Rules 
Fairness Rule 
Number (Percentage) of 
Respondents Reporting Rule at 
BBU 
Number (Percentage) of 
Respondents Reporting Rule at 
ARU 
   
Specific rules 19 (100) 7 (100) 
Established rules 18 (95) 5 (71)  
   
 
 
 
Table 5 
Rule Usage Associated with Fair and Unfair Perceptions 
 
 
Number (Percentage) of Respondents Reporting Rule 
Fairness Rule 
 
Fair Unfair 
     
Specific rules 14 (100) 12 (100) 
Other universities 4 (29) 4 (33) 
Market norms  7 (50) 6 (50) 
Performance of entrepreneur in negotiations 3 (21) 1 (8) 
Negotiator support 5 (36) 3 (25) 
Easiness and length of negotiation  7 (50) 6 (50) 
Cooperation and support by university  11 (79) 7 (58) 
Venture control  4 (29) 7 (58) 
Future value 6 (43) 5 (42) 
Entitlement university 2 (14) 4 (33) 
     
Established rules  10 (71) 11 (92) 
Distributive  7 (50) 9 (75) 
Procedural 11 (79) 9 (75) 
Interpersonal 7 (50) 5 (42) 
Informational 3 (21) 4 (30) 
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Table 6 
Rule Usage Over Time (In 3 Cases) 
Fairness Rule 
 
Time 1 Time 2 
   
Specific rules 4 4 
Other universities 1 1 
Market norms  3 3 
Performance of entrepreneur in negotiations 1 2 
Negotiator support 0 0 
Easiness and length of negotiation  1 3 
Cooperation and support by university  2 3 
Venture control  1 1 
Future value 3 2 
Entitlement university 2 0 
   
Established rules 4 3 
Distributive 2 3 
Procedural 4 3 
Interpersonal 2 2 
Informational 3 1 
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Table 7 
Rule Usage Associated with Entrepreneur Characteristics 
 
 
Number (Percentage) of Respondents Reporting Rule 
 Experience Relational Capital 
Fairness Rule High Low  High Medium Low 
            
Specific rules            
Other universities 4 (33) 4 (29)  2 (29) 4 (50) 2 (18) 
Market norms  6 (50) 6 (43)  1 (14) 4 (50) 7 (64) 
Performance of entrepreneur in negotiations 1 (8) 3 (21)  0 (0) 1 (13) 3 (27) 
Negotiator support 4 (33) 4 (29)  4 (57) 1 (13) 3 (27) 
Easiness and length of negotiation  4 (33) 9 (64)  2 (29) 5 (63) 6 (55) 
Cooperation and support by university  8 (67) 9 (64)  2 (29) 5 (63) 11 (100) 
Venture control  5 (42) 5 (36)  4 (57) 3 (38) 3 (27) 
Future value 5 (42) 6 (43)  1 (14) 5 (63) 5 (45) 
Entitlement university 3 (25) 3 (21)  1 (14) 3 (38) 2 (18) 
            
Established rules            
Distributive 7 (58) 10 (71)  4 (57) 7 (88) 6 (55) 
Procedural 7 (58) 11 (79)  4 (57) 6 (75) 9 (82) 
Interpersonal 5 (42) 7 (50)  2 (29) 5 (63) 5 (45) 
Informational 0 (0) 7 (50)  1 (14) 3 (38) 3 (27) 
           
 
